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ABSTRACT 
Network security monitoring is an important element in incident response and 
forensics investigation. Most forensic investigators are trained to recognize abusive 
network behavior in conventional information systems, but they may not have the 
technical skills to detect anomalous traffic patterns in industrial control systems that 
manage critical infrastructure services. We have developed and laboratory-tested hands-
on teaching material to introduce students to forensics investigation of intrusions on an 
industrial network. Rather than using prototypes of ICS components, our approach 
utilizes commercial industrial products to provide students a more realistic simulation of 
an ICS network. The lessons cover four different types of attacks and the corresponding 
post-incident network data analysis. This report describes the initial development of these 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, industrial control systems (ICS) have increasingly become targets 
of cyber-attacks. These cyber-physical systems are no longer isolated, as they are 
alarmingly connected to vulnerable external networks to provide real-time assessment of 
operating conditions. Our research investigates vulnerabilities in widely-used industrial 
network protocols and develops hands-on course material to introduce students to 
forensics investigation of intrusions on industrial networks.  
 
A. MOTIVATION 
A recent publicly reported ICS attack was a large-scale power outage in Ukraine 
in December 2015. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reported that the attack 
crippled three regional power distribution companies through a series of highly 
synchronized operations that required extensive, long-term reconnaissance of the target 
operating environment [1]. Other reports indicated that variants of the BlackEnergy and 
KillDisk (aka Disakil Trojan) malware were present on the compromised system [2, 3]. 
In December 2014, ICS-CERT issued an alert stating that control system networks in the 
United States have been infected by the BlackEnergy malware since 2011. ICS-CERT 
recently confirmed that a BlackEnergy 3 variant was present on the Ukrainian systems, 
and that it appears to have been delivered via spear phishing emails with malicious 
attachments [4]. 
IRONGATE, an ICS malware that surfaced in June 2016 [5], includes a Stuxnet-
style exploit with enhancements, i.e., sandbox evasion, and hiding its activity by actively 
recording and replaying process data. At the time of its discovery, IRONGATE seemed 
to be prototype malware, but its existence confirms the threat of stealthy malware lurking 
in repositories and potentially operational ICS networks. It was introduced in 2014 but 
not detected until late 2015 by researchers who were looking for a different exploit—
antivirus software used in the hosting malware repository did not recognize it. 
The Department of Homeland Security’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber 
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) reports that, for fiscal year 2015, there was an 
increase in reported vulnerabilities relating to cryptographic issues, poor code quality, 
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credentials management, and access controls (including permissions and privileges 
management). The report also shows a significant decrease in the improper input 
validation category, and no change in vulnerabilities concerning resource control [6]. 
Figure 1 illustrates this trend analysis. 
 
 
Figure 1. ICS vulnerabilities reported to ICS-CERT. Source: [6]. 
 
Modern industrial network protocols have evolved from serial-based fieldbus 
protocols to Ethernet-based protocols that operate at the application layer of the TCP/IP 
networking model [7, 8]. The Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) [9] and 
Ethernet/Industrial Protocol (EtherNet/IP) [10] are two well-known Ethernet-based 
industrial network protocols. They are managed by the Open DeviceNet Vendors 
Association (ODVA) and are used by a large number of industrial automation vendors. 
The Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley (RA/AB) ControlLogix programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs) implement these protocols, and a number of EtherNet/IP and CIP 
vulnerabilities in the ControlLogix PLCs have been identified since 2012 [11, 12]. 
Network security monitoring is an important element in incident response and 
forensics investigation for both Information Technology (IT) and Operational 
Technology (OT) systems. Passive monitoring does not disrupt time-critical control 
processes and thus is well suited for use in an OT environment. Similar to analyzing 
conventional network traffic data in IT systems, interpreting the flow of industrial 
network traffic requires knowing the difference between the expected and observed 
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behavior of the OT systems. Most forensic investigators are trained to recognize abusive 
network behavior in IT systems. However, industrial network protocols such as 
EtherNet/IP and CIP differ significantly from the traditional network protocols, and these 




The protocols used in each ICS application domain are driven by application-
specific need such as connectivity, reliability, safety, and more recently security. As 
PLCs communicate with field devices and human operators (via human-machine 
interface (HMI) systems), their network traffic contains information that can provide 
important clues about the characteristics of an attack.  
This report describes the initial development of four hands-on lessons on 
forensics analysis of industrial network traffic. These lessons can be used as a standalone 
ICS module in a traditional network forensics course, or be assimilated to create more 
advanced lessons in an ICS forensics course. Our work focuses on the EtherNet/IP 
protocols and ControlLogix PLC since, according to a user survey conducted by the ARC 
Advisory Group [13], Rockwell Automation has a large market share in North America. 
Our contribution also includes the establishment of an EtherNet/IP network data corpus 
that we plan to make available to other researchers. 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews prior 
work and Chapter III provides basic information on industrial network protocols. Chapter 
IV discusses our experimental laboratory and data collection process, while Chapter V 
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II. RELATED WORK 
In many Computer Science curricula, computer communications and network 
security are core courses that teach students the concepts and technology of the Internet 
protocol suite, and how to secure those protocols. Several works confirm the need for a 
security curriculum with an emphasis on control systems security [14, 15, 16]. Other 
prior efforts on ICS security education include the design and development of teaching 
laboratories [17, 18, 19] and teaching modules [20, 21, 22]. 
The SEED project has developed a suite of hands-on laboratory exercises that can 
be used in computer and information security courses [23]. These labs are grouped into 
six categories: software security, network security, web security, system security, mobile 
device security, and cryptography. To date, there is no SEED lab that focuses ICS 
security [24]. Our research aims to fill this gap. 
There are different application domains in the ICS landscape, e.g., process 
automation, power generation and distribution, and supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA). A generalized view of a SCADA system consists of a supervisory 
center in which human operators uses human-machine interface (HMI) software to 
control automated tasks performed by the field devices, and a control network in which 
intelligent controllers (e.g., PLCs and Remote Terminal Units (RTU)) manipulate the 
mechanical functions of the field devices as directed by the operators. McGrew and 
Vaughn describe several software vulnerabilities associated with a commercial HMI 
product such as password recovery, insecure network authentication, and user 
authentication bypass [25]. On the control side, Grandgenett et al. discuss several attacks 
that exploit EtherNet/IP and CIP vulnerabilities in a ControlLogix PLC [26, 27]. They 
describe two EtherNet/IP denial-of-service attacks, one TCP connection hoarding attack, 
and two CIP attacks that allow an attacker to bypass the PLC authentication mechanism 
and to remotely send privileged commands to the PLC. 
Barbosa proposes an anomaly detection mechanism for SCADA systems that is 
based on the periodic request-response patterns in industrial network traffic [28]. Their 
research utilizes network packet traces collected at various water treatment and energy 
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(gas and electricity) facilities to formulate the differences between industrial network 
protocols (e.g., Modbus) and traditional network protocols. 
The CRISALIS project has developed the FERRET forensics investigation 
platform for the acquisition and analysis of forensic data of industrial control systems 
[29]. This platform consists of collection agents deployed on selected supervisory hosts, a 
processing backend component, and a web-based analysis frontend component. While 
FERRET was used to investigate security incidents in an actual wind power installation, 
it lacks the ability to collect and analyze industrial network traffic. 
Folkerth discusses the need for including field devices in a forensics program and 
presents techniques for detecting and analyzing ICS compromises using captured network 
data [30]. This work shows that analyzing packet trace files can help identify 
reconnaissance activities and targeted PLC exploitations. Folkerth’s approach is most 
closely related to ours. 
 NETRESEC maintains a repository of publicly available ICS packet trace files 
that were captured during various ICS attack challenges [31]. The PLCs used in 
DigitalBond S4x15 capture-the-flag competitions were Schneider Electric Modicon, 
Allen Bradley MicroLogix, Advantech ADAM, and Wago PLC [32]. The PLCs used in 
the ICS Geek Lounge lab at the 2015 4SICS ICS summit were DirectLogic 205, Siemens 
S7-1200, and xLogic x-Messenger [33]. In contrast, we use ControlLogix PLCs to 
generate our data corpus of network traffic. 
Last, Morris and Gao describe four datasets of industrial network traffic that were 
created from various attacks against two simulated SCADA systems [34]. This work 
closely relates to our research except that it focuses on the MODBUS protocol while our 






III. BACKGROUND  
This chapter provides basic information on the industrial network protocols and 
functional model for an industrial automation and control system (IACS) used in our 
research. 
 
A. REFERENCE FUNCTIONAL MODEL  
For this work, we adopt the functional hierarchy model of ANSI/ISA-99.00.01-
2007, which was jointly developed by the American National Standards Institute and the 
ISA99 Committee for Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security of the 
International Society of Automation [35].  The ISA99 model partitions the architecture of 
an IACS into five layers as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. ISA99 Reference Model. Source: [35] 
 
The enterprise systems in the Level 4 layer consist of corporate systems and 
applications that manage the organization's industrial environment. The operations 
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management systems in the Level 3 layer are responsible for managing the work-flow of 
an IACS. Monitoring and controlling the physical process are the primary functions of 
the supervisory control systems in the Level 2 layer. This layer is where supervisory 
systems such as the HMI and process historian systems exist. The systems in the Level 1 
layer perform continuous sensing and manipulation of the physical devices. They include 
safety controllers and processing controllers such as PLCs and RTUs. The systems in the 
Layer 0 layer are the field devices such as sensors, actuators, and physical equipment.  
Our work focuses on the Level 1 layer and the communications channels between 
the Level 1 and Level 2 layers; the components used in these areas are complex and 
historically designed for real-time functionality, not security. 
 
B. COMMON INDUSTRIAL PROTOCOL  
The Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) models each node in the network as a set 
of objects (Figure 3). The following definitions are taken from the CIP specification [9]. 
An object provides “an abstraction of a component within a product.” A class is a set of 
objects that “are identical in form and behavior, but may contain different attribute 
values.” An object instance is “the actual representation of a particular object within a 
class.” An instance of a class shares “the same set of attributes, but has its own particular 
set of attribute values.” An attribute describes “an externally visible characteristic or 
feature” of an object. 
 
Figure 3. A CIP node with multiple object instances. Source: [9]. 
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Each object or class supports a set of common services (defined in Appendix A of 
[9]), and in certain products, a number of vendor-specific services. For example, the 
Identity object “provides identification of and general information about the device,” and 
the Status attribute (attribute ID=5) of the Identity Object provides the “current status of 
the entire device” [9].  
 
C. ETHERNET/INDUSTRIAL PROTOCOL 
The Ethernet/Industrial Protocol (EtherNet/IP), also known as “CIP over 
Ethernet”, uses standard Ethernet and TCP/IP protocols to transport CIP messages 
[ENIP]. EtherNet/IP supports two types of communications: UDP-based implicit 
messaging for time-critical operations and TCP-based explicit messaging for operations 
that are not time-sensitive. An implicit message can be multicast or unicast, and requires 
a CIP connection to be established between the two devices; an explicit message does not 
require a CIP connection. EtherNet/IP uses the same port number (44818 or 0xAF12) for 
both UDP and TCP connections. 
The EtherNet/IP encapsulation message inside a TCP/UDP packet consists of a 
24-byte header and a command-specific data portion (Figure 4) [10].  
 
 
Figure 4. EtherNet/IP packet format. Source: [10]. 
 
There are both pre-defined commands and vendor-specific commands, and the 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 11 
IV. APPROACH 
In this chapter, we describe the threat model we used to formulate the attack 
scenarios, our ICS experimental laboratory, and our data collection process. 
 
A. THREAT MODEL 
A 2016 congressional report by the Government Accountability Office states that 
the most serious and most often attacks come from nation states, and the most serious 
threat source is the malicious insider [36]. The report is based on information collected 
from eighteen government agencies having high-impact systems, including the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. While the report is not ICS-specific, the summaries contained 
therein provide insight into cyber threats encountered by operational systems. 
Any given weakness in a constituent element of a control system (redundancy 
mechanisms, monitoring and logging services, etc.) can adversely impact its security 
posture. NIST SP 800-82 discusses a number of common attacks such as reprograming 
PLC firmware, sending false status to the operator, modifying the functionality of safety 
mechanisms, manipulating configuration settings, and denying control actions [37]. 
For this work, we formulate the attack scenarios described in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Attack scenarios 
Type Attack Scenarios 
  
Reconnaissance Probing functionalities implemented in the target PLC 
Data exfiltration Exploiting vulnerable services to obtain high-value data 
Malicious insider  Performing unauthorized operations that affect the target 
PLC’s execution state 
Denial-of-service  Exploiting a protocol-specific vulnerability in the target 
PLC’s  EtherNet/IP implementation  
 
These attack scenarios assume the existence of a rogue machine on the control 
network and a malicious insider with unfettered access to the target PLC. 
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B. EXPERIMENTAL LABORATORY 
A high-level view of our experimental control system is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. ICS experimental laboratory. 
 
The supervisory segment consists of two HMI systems, a Historian system, a 
multi-purpose Linux test workstation, and a development system. The workstation can be 
configured to assume different functional roles such as a maintenance system or a rogue 
machine. In the control segment, there are three modular PLC racks and one remote I/O 
unit; each connects to one or more field devices. The PLCs implement the producer-
consumer communications model to share data among themselves. Two industrial 
network switches facilitate communications between the supervisory and control 
networks; these switches support both standard Ethernet and EtherNet/IP. Standard 
Ethernet is used by the supervisory systems to communicate with each other while 
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EtherNet/IP is used by the supervisory systems communicate with the PLCs, and by the 
PLCs to communicate with each other.  
In this work, only a subset of the equipment is used to develop the forensics 
lessons. This lab environment consists of a Windows HMI system, a Hirschmann 
industrial switch, the test workstation configured as a rogue system to launch attacks on 
the PLC, and a PLC rack, and a network monitor (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Lesson development laboratory. 
 
The PLC rack is an RA/AB 1756 ControlLogix system [38] that consists of a 
controller (CPU) module and multiple I/O modules—an EtherNet/IP communication 
module used to communicate with the HMI system, an analog input (AI) module, an 
analog output (AO) module, a digital input (DI) module, a serial communication module, 
and a second EtherNet/IP module used to communicate with the RTU. These I/O 
modules communicate with the controller module via a proprietary backplane. For the 
forensics lessons, the controller runs a ladder logic application that controls two field 
devices: a simulated fluid tank system (commonly found on ships) and a robotic arm—a 
stand-in for any serial-connected, motorized apparatus, e.g., a rudder system. 
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The HMI system runs the RA Studio 5000 Logix Designer software [39], which is 
used to develop and run ladder logic applications on the controller. The HMI system 
regularly asks the controller for I/O statuses and the controller’s current operating mode.  
 
C. DATA COLLECTION 
In this work, we use the network packet analyzer Wireshark1 to capture and 
analyze network traffic between the HMI systems and the PLCs, and between the PLCs 
themselves. Wireshark supports a larger number of protocol display filters, including one 
filter for EtherNet/IP and several filters for different CIP objects. 
We construct a data corpus that contains four datasets of network trace files 
captured by Wireshark (Table 2). The organization of the datasets is based on specific 
operations from the observed PLC(s). 
  
Table 2. Summary of data corpus. 
ID Description 
  
Dataset A Single PLC with local I/O operations 
Dataset B  Single PLC with remote I/O operations 
Dataset C  Multiple PLCs with producer-consumer operations  
Dataset D  Single PLC with malicious operations  
 
Dataset A contains EtherNet/IP packets used to control the simulated fluid tank 
system and the robotic arm, including the use of a simulated HMI override mechanism 
that allows a local operator to control the equipment in case of an emergency. The data 
captured in Dataset B represent the communications between a master PLC and a slave 
remote I/O unit to control a remote field device—a simulated steering system. Three 
PLCs are used to generate the producer-consumer traffic for Dataset C; one PLC 
functions as the producer and the other PLCs act as consumers (see Figure 5). In this data 
exchange model, the producer PLC broadcasts a shared tag (variable) and multiple 
                                                
1 Wireshark website: https://www.wireshark.org/ 
2 SCADA StrangeLove SCADAPASS, https://github.com/scadastrangelove/SCADAPASS 
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consumer PLCs can simultaneously receive the same tag without additional programming 
logic.  
Dataset D consists of six packet trace files that are used to develop the forensics 
lessons. The lessons and packet statistics associated with the capture file used in each 
lesson are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Summary of packet trace files in dataset D. 
ID Forensics Lesson Total Packets 
EtherNet/IP 
Packets 
    
Capture I Reconnaissance—PLC information 14232 390 (2.7%) 
Capture II Reconnaissance—TCP/IP services 1829 312 (17.1%) 
Capture III Data exfiltration 1177 294 (25.0%) 
Capture IV Malicious insider—normal activity 90 50 (55.6%) 
Capture V Malicious insider—abnormal activity  848 490 (57.8%) 
Capture VI Denial-of-service 202006 42660 (21.1%) 
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V. LESSON DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter describes the attack scenarios and the hands-on lessons that we 
develop to address various aspects of ICS incident assessment. 
 
A. ATTACK SCENARIOS 
The attack scenarios range from well-known vulnerabilities such as password 
recovery to malicious insider incidents and denial-of-service attacks (see Table 1). The 
malicious insider attack is against the ControlLogix CPU module whereas the other three 
attacks are against the ControlLogix Ethernet/IP module. 
1. Reconnaissance Attack 
Reconnaissance activity is often difficult to detect if it was done using the same 
tools and processes prescribed for regular system maintenance, e.g., reviewing 
component configuration and status via a web browsing interface. In this scenario, the 
attack is against the integrated web server; it allows remote systems to monitor and 
manipulate controller data. When contacted, the web server returns a home page that 
includes a list of available operations, some of which require user login with appropriate 
access permissions. However, the web server’s password authentication mechanism is 
susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack [12], and it is common knowledge that ICS 
operators tend to use vendor default or easy-to-remember passwords for ease of 
maintenance. The ControlLogix EtherNet/IP module’s default password is included in 
SCADAPASS—a list of default passwords of ICS products maintained by the SCADA 
StrangeLove research group2. 
Unprotected operations that do not require login can be exploited to obtain 
information about the web server, and the configuration of the PLC rack, including the 
model number and firmware version of each module in the rack, and the running status of 
each PLC module. This information allows an attacker to construct malware targeting the 
specific web server and PLC modules. 
                                                
2 SCADA StrangeLove SCADAPASS, https://github.com/scadastrangelove/SCADAPASS 
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In this scenario, we assume that the attacker successfully guesses a password and 
can access protected web pages to discover other vulnerable embedded services. While 
the vendor recommends keeping these services disabled when not in use, they are 
customarily left to run once they are enabled. 
2. Data Exfiltration Attack 
In addition to web access, the ControlLogix EtherNet/IP module provides other 
TCP/IP services, including file transfer (via the File Transfer Protocol (FTP)), email (via 
the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol), and network management (via the Simple Network 
Management Protocol). This attack scenario focuses on the FTP server since, while 
inherently insecure, FTP is generally used in ICS. Similar to other FTP servers, the 
ControlLogix FTP server also transmits the password in plain text. 
The FTP server allows access to the file system on the EtherNet/IP module whose 
directory structure is divided into two categories: normal-access and special-access. 
Module configuration files and data view files3 are special-access files; they can only be 
accessed when the module is in backup/restore mode. Normal-access files can always be 
accessed, and include Electronic Data Sheet (EDS) files, predefined web pages, custom 
web pages, and user-defined files.  
An EDS file is a text file provided by the device vendor that contains device-
specific configuration data [9]. An EDS file for a ControlLogix module contains the 
module’s firmware version, device characteristics, and TCP/IP capability (e.g., the total 
number of TCP/IP connections the module can sustain without performance impact, 
TCP/IP inactivity timeout, and CIP inactivity timeout). For a ControlLogix module, 
multiple EDS files can be found in the file system if the module went through multiple 
firmware updates. An attacker can use FTP to retrieve the EDS files and use the 
information contained in those files to craft a targeted malware. 
3. Malicious Insider Attack 
The ControlLogix CPU module has a mechanical mode switch on the front of the 
module that sets the operating mode of the controller. The location of this switch affords 
an adversary a quick and non-intrusive mechanism to alter the operating behavior of the 
                                                
3 A data view file contains information about a set of tags (variable in PLC memory). 
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controller, which can greatly affect the industrial control process. The CPU module can 
be in one of five operating modes [40]. In the Run mode, the controller continuously 
monitors and controls the I/O modules, and process control applications cannot be 
modified. In the Program mode, the controller stops executing application code and does 
not control the I/O modules. While in this mode, applications can be modified or loaded 
from the controller’s user memory. The Remote Run mode is identical to the Run mode 
except that applications can be modified remotely. Similarly, the Remote Program mode 
is identical to the Program mode except its operations can be invoked remotely. In the 
Remote Test mode, the controller continues executing the loaded application code, stops 
controlling the I/O modules, and provides limited editing capability.  
In this attack scenario, an insider gains physical access to the PLC rack and uses 
the mode switch to manipulate the controller’s operating mode.  
4. Denial-of-Service Attack 
This attack utilizes the RegisterSession command to cause a resource exhaustion 
condition on the ControlLogix Ethernet/IP module. The RegisterSession command must 
be executed to establish an EtherNet/IP session prior to any CIP communications 
between two devices. The session handle returned in a RegisterSession reply is used in all 
subsequent EtherNet/IP messages until the session is terminated, either via the 
UnRegisterSession command or when the TCP connection is closed. The session handle 
is a 32-bit unique value generated by the target device, and its assignment is application-
dependent. The session handles captured in the Capture VI (see Table 3) indicate that the 
ControlLogix EtherNet/IP module increments the session handle value by one hundred 
hexadecimal. 
Using a Python program that repeatedly sends the RegisterSession command 
without terminating any existing sessions, we observe that the EthereNet/IP module 
eventually stops responding to the RequestSession command after 17000 (approx.) 
requests. The CIP messages between the HMI system and the PLC also cease afterward. 
The line graphs in Figure 7 illustrate the observed behavior. 
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Figure 7. Resource exhaustion using RequestSession command. 
 
The blue graph shows all TCP/IP traffic captured in the packet trace. The red 
graph depicts successful RequestSession commands, i.e., the EtherNet/IP module 
returned non-zero session handles. The green graph indicates CIP traffic between the 
HMI system and the PLC. This attack leverages the EtherNet/IP exploit described by 
Grandgenett et al. [26]. 
 
B. LESSON DESCRIPTION 
Analysis of packet captures from a network monitor in an ICS is an important step 
towards understanding what has transpired on the control network. Captured network data 
between an HMI and a PLC can provide a record of commands to field devices, malware 
payloads, and exfiltration of field data during a breach. The objective of the lessons is to 
introduce students to common vulnerabilities in an industrial network and a commercial 
EtherNet/IP implementation, and to demonstrate the importance of industrial network 
data analysis in forensics investigations. 
The lessons require students to have working knowledge of common TCP/IP 
application protocols such as HTTP and FTP, familiarity with basic ICS terminology and 
concepts, and have hands-on experience with packet analysis using Wireshark. The 
instructor is expected to deliver the following units at the beginning of the lessons: 
 21 
• A review of HTTP and FTP protocols, and HTML document format. The 
review only needs to cover the basic structure of HTTP authentication and 
the GET method, basic FTP commands, and basic structure of a webpage 
and HTML elements. 
• A review of ICS fundamentals. 
• An explanation of the EtherNet/IP session management. 
• An explanation of the CIP Identity object and two common services— 
Get Attribute List (GAL) and Multiple Service Packet (MSP).  
The lessons are in the form of hands-on exercises, in which students use 
Wireshark to analyze one or more packet capture (PCAP) files in dataset D and answer a 
series of questions in a written report to demonstrate their comprehension of the assigned 
tasks. The students must provide evidence from the PCAP files that supports their 
answers. A naïve way to ensure that each student performs his or her own work is to 
change the timestamp values in the original PCAP files to make a unique PCAP file for 
each student. This parameterization can easily be done via a script that uses Wireshark’s 
editcap utility4 to make the time adjustment. 
There are four lessons; each corresponds to an attack scenario described earlier. 
The following sections describe the objectives and learning outcomes, which are assessed 
through written reports. 
1. Lesson 1: Reconnaissance  
This lesson demonstrates how a rogue machine on the network can discover 
information about the PLC configuration and its embedded services from browsing the 
web server running on the ControlLogix EtherNet/IP module. This lesson consists of two 
exercises. In the first exercise, students examine the Capture I packet trace to reconstruct 
the browsing activities used by the attacker to learn about the different modules installed 
in a PLC rack. Vendor documentation (available on the Internet) indicates that the 
ControlLogix EtherNetIP modules support several TCP/IP application services. In the 
second exercise, students inspect the Capture II packet trace to determine how the 
attacker uncovers which services are enabled. 
                                                
4 editcap manual page: https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/editcap.html 
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Upon successfully completing this lesson, the students will be able to:  
• Describe the actions performed by the attacker; 
• Describe the types of information returned from the web queries; 
• Identify the available TCP/IP services. 
2. Lesson 2: Data Exfiltration 
After finding out which application services are enabled on a controller, the next 
step for the attacker is to exploit those services to obtain high-value control data. The 
objective of this lesson is to show how such data can be extracted if a vulnerable service 
such as FTP is left running on the PLC. This lesson uses the Capture III packet trace. 
At the end of this lesson, the students will be able to: 
• Identify the type of embedded FTP server used in the ControlLogix 
EtherNet/IP module based on useful information such as the name, the 
version number, and the operating system on which the software is 
designed to run; 
• Describe the commands issued to and data returned from the FTP server; 
• Describe the contents of the retrieved data which include EDS files of the 
EtherNet/IP module; 
• Discuss a hypothetical attack scenario based on their understanding of the 
EDS data. 
3. Lesson 3: Controller Manipulation  
This lesson addresses the malicious insider threat described in Section 5.A.3 
above. The main task is to analyze CIP messages in two packet traces (Capture IV and 
Capture V) to determine the actions taken by the insider.  
This lesson requires a basic understanding of how the Identity object is used in the 
Get Attribute List (GAL) and Multiple Service Packet (MSP) services. The GAL service 
returns the value(s) of the requested object attribute(s) or class attribute(s); the MSP 
service allows a CIP client (e.g., the HMI system) to request a CIP server (e.g., the 
controller) to perform a number of services in a single CIP message. In this lesson, the 
HMI system uses the MSP service with multiple embedded GAL requests to obtain 
device and I/O information from different modules in the PLC rack. One of those GAL 
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requests returns the current status of the CPU module via the Status attribute of the 
Identity object.   
After completing this lesson, the students will be able to: 
• Interpret EtherNet//IP packets to determine the number of active 
EtherNet/IP sessions between the HMI system and the PLC; 
• Describe the CIP traffic between the HMI system and the PLC; 
• Describe how the CPU module uses the CIP Identity object to report its 
operating mode at a given time; 
• Compare and contrast normal traffic and abnormal traffic to detect 
unauthorized operating mode changes. 
4. Lesson 4: Resource Exhaustion  
The narrative for this lesson is as follows: The HMI system reports that 
EtherNet/IP communications with the PLC has been lost, but there is no error indication 
on the controller module or the EtherNet/IP module, i.e., the status LEDs on the front 
panel of those modules still indicate that the modules are running normally. The HMI 
system can still “ping” the EtherNet/IP module, however subsequent requests to establish 
EtherNet/IP sessions continue to fail. This problem persists until the PLC system is reset.  
Whereas Lesson 3 focuses on the CIP services, this lesson concentrates on the 
RegisterSession EtherNet/IP command (see Section 5.A.4). The objective is to show how 
a deficiency in a protocol implementation could be used to silently bring down a PLC.  
The students will be able to: 
• Describe the mechanism (i.e., repeatedly asking for new EtherNet/IP 
sessions without terminating existing sessions) and resource (i.e., the pool 
of session handles) used by the attacker to cause the observed denial-of-
service condition. 
• Build a time line of events leading to the observed malfunction. 
• Describe the algorithm used by the ControlLogix EtherNet/IP 
implementation to allocate session handles. 
In summary, the skills that the students gain from the four lessons are essential for 
meeting the goal of exposing students to network forensics in industrial control systems, 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This report describes the initial results of our effort to develop hands-on lessons 
that expose students to network forensics in an industrial network. The lessons 
demonstrate that by critically analyzing the network traffic between the supervisory 
systems and the control systems, a forensics investigator can identify malicious activities 
injected into a control network, ranging from seemingly innocuous reconnaissance 
operations to the massive consumption of a critical resource that can silence a PLC.  
The lessons have been laboratory-tested and will be used in a new computer 
science course that considers threats and vulnerabilities in operational technologies 
employed in critical infrastructure. The lessons and our EtherNet/IP network data corpus 
will be publicly disseminated after they are “field-tested” by students. 
As our investigation on vulnerabilities in industrial protocol implementations 
continues, we plan to develop additional lessons to facilitate transfer of our findings into 
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